The Tunisian miracle… maybe

Banner hung at the election commission explains the process to voters

A lot of the journalists here in Tunis, where I am to cover Sunday’s elections, are writing this story: In the months since the Arab Spring began, change has been rolled back, thwarted, and repressed in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and even Libya. But there’s one exception: Tunisia. The place where it all began is still the Arab world’s best hope for democracy.

There’s some truth to this — a lot actually. And I think it helps that Tunisians themselves realize this fact: that they are the best chance, the leading country, and the example-setter for what comes next. The sense of responsibility to rise above the goals of political gains are present throughout society. Analysts, candidates, and citizens have also expressed this sentiment.

But here’s where I fear there could be–though hopefully won’t be!–an achilles heel. In many ways the blessing and the curse of the Tunisian revolution is that they never destroyed the state. There was no gutting of the bureaucracy; people who held their posts, even in the dreaded interior ministry, largely still do. Aside from a decapitation of the top ranks, there was no purge the way that there has been in Libya for example. The state still works. Water is running, cops direct traffic, electricity is great, and the ministries even still update their websites.

The curse half of that is that there is a profound sense that the order has been changed only artificially, and that those who benefited from “the system” will continue to do so–no matter what happens in the vote. Presumably, those who are nested in that system are also very keen not to change it, a fact that may stagnate or even block reforms all together. Tunisia today is a place where the conversation is open but the same government is running the show.

That’s not necessarily dangerous. Many of those who worked under Ben Ali were exceedingly competent — which is reflected in Tunisia’s strong economic performance (on macro indicators), its favorability among donors and foreign investors, and its generally solid system of public services, at least in the major cities. But here’s the thing: If there isn’t change fast enough to meet the expectations of those who started the revolution, they may demand change again–and again. Or they might lost interest all together. And neither scenario bodes well for a new democracy that is getting its feet.

I’m not a pessimist though, not by any means. I was once told by a very wise politician (former pres) that if you treat the electorate as the responsible and mature citizens they are, they will never disappoint you. If the parties that are contesting the polls this week and in the months and years to come can rise to the occasion–as I think the majority will–I think Tunisia will do more than fine. In fact, I can’t wait to see what Tunisia does. It could surprise us all.

I trust in that because there is incredible pride beaming from the streets of Tunis this week. Everyone feels the weight of what’s about to happen: the first democratic vote this country has ever had, and the first real election to take place (aside from Egypt’s referendum) since the dictators began to fall in the Arab Spring. Everyone–no matter how many concerns they have or complaints they express–suddenly changes tone when you ask them if they are hopeful for the elections and for the future. As long as they believe, why shouldn’t we?

Tunisia’s elections — pre-departure thoughts

I’ll be heading to Tunisia beginning tomorrow to cover the elections (on October 23) to form a Constituent Assembly — the body that will draft a new Constitution for the country’s next phase. More to come once I’m on the ground, but a few thoughts before heading off about things to look for as the vote nears.

The supposed secular vs. Islamist split: A great deal of the buzz so far has been over the alleged war of ideas on the streets of Tunisia, between those who would prefer to see a secular state and those who would rather that the new draft Constitution draw more heavily on Islam. The story goes like this: Tunisia’s historical character as a secular state is being threatened by Al Nahda, an Islamically-grounded party outlawed under Ben Ali that that has had a renaissance (no pun intended) in the post-revolutionary days. Almost all polling so far indicates that the party’s moderate Islamic platform will carry about 30 percent of votes — perhaps more, given that there is a large pool of undecided voters. That makes the party the largest single political player on the very diverse Tunisian stage (there are some 100 parties now officially constituted, 60 of which will field candidates for the Constituent Assembly — plus scores of independents.) Meanwhile, the more left-leaning ‘secular’ vote seems like it could be split between a number of smaller parties, perhaps shifting the balance in favor of the Islamist-leaning camp.

Recent high profile protests by hardliners have rocked the streets of Tunis in recent days, giving credence to the idea that a Islamist-Secular split has emerged. Most recently, an odd controversy erupted when Salafists attacked a TV channel, angry that it had featured the animated film Persepolis, about a young Iranian girl who flees that country’s revolution for France. Their complaints specifically were that the film insulted their beliefs by caricaturing God in cartoon form. The television station apologized, but the media authority still opened an investigation, alarming secular Tunisians who worried about censorship and press freedom.

What I find most fascinating about the supposed polarization is how self fulfilling a prophecy this could be. In my initial interview this week with regional experts, I was shocked at how many of them seemed to take this polarization for granted — and assume that there was little middle ground between the two groups. I’ll be looking into this more once I’m in Tunisia, but for the moment, all the evidence I’ve seen actually indicates something of the opposite. Parties’ goals almost all stipulate a moral role for Islam in the construction of the state, even as the democratic order is given space to flourish. To be sure, there will be grand debates and big compromises to come when the new constitutional body is founded. But there is a middle that seems to me to have been eclipsed by the more visible extremes — on either side.

Yet the assumption that these two groups are irreconcilable is already cemented into the narrative. And it seems to me to be mirrored not just in Tunisia but elsewhere there Arab Spring is sparking debates about a  new kind of Arab governance. My hope is that the Tunisian elections will prove this dichotomy to be, as Obama loves to say, a “false choice” between the secular and the religious.

It’s the economy, stupid. The protests that unseated Ben Ali were hardly the last to rock Tunisia in 2011. In fact, the striking and demonstrating has gone on, in a sputtering sort of way, ever since last December. There are lots of things one could attribute this to — a desire not to see the gains of the revolution rolled back, efforts by competing ideologies to gain public space, and general frustration. But what nearly everyone seems to agree on is that the dismal state of the economy is motivating at least some of the persistent outrage. Tourism has collapsed, foreign direct investment is way down, and after years of steady GDP growth, this year the economy may even contract.

This may be one of the ironies of the Tunisian revolution: that a political change motivated in part by the lack of jobs and opportunity will actually set back economic progress in some regards. The hope is, of course, that when it does start churning again, the economy will grow in a way that is both faster and more equally beneficial to the country’s 10 million people. Yet in order for that to happen, the coming caretaker governments will need to resolve their differences (whether ideological or social) quite quickly when it comes to crafting economic policy. And the economy itself will need to make some rather heavy structural shifts, opening up industries that take more and better qualified employees — think services, medical care, and outsourcing.

The interim government’s new economic strategy, leaked late last month to the Tunisian press agency (TAP) speaks to these goals — focusing on unemployment and a kick start for tourism and foreign investment. Implementing is of course the tricky bit, as always. And continuity will also be a challenge, as the incoming assembly may want to revise or refocus certain parts of the plan. In the meantime, investors say they are holding off taking big decisions about their businesses in Tunisia. In the boardroom, uncertainty over a country’s economic direction is a real buzz kill. The streets may feel so too!

The role of independent candidates: Independent candidates may well play a significant role in the upcoming vote, particularly in regions where an independent candidate is a public persona or has strong regional social ties. Given how little time there has been for political parties to constitute themselves following Ben Ali’s departure, there is a whole cadre of prominent Tunisians who are betting that they can do as least as well standing on their own as trying to cobble together a party. Should a significant number of independents win (or even if a very diverse group of smaller parties win), the big question mark hangs over the assembly members’ abilities to form coalitions and unite around a platform for a new Constitution.

Stay tuned!